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1. Introduction
Since Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, we know that EU law enjoys
primacy over the constitutional law of the Member States.1 Article 53 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights did not change this longstanding principle, as
the ECJ clarified when it gave precedence to EU law over a Spanish
constitutional right in Melloni.2
InM.A.S., the ECJ was once more asked to resolve a conflict between a rule
of EU law that was compatible with the Charter and a national constitutional
right, this time in response to a preliminary reference from the Italian
Constitutional Court. The conflict emerged from the Court’s previous
judgment in Taricco, in which it had identified a duty for national courts to
disapply national rules on statutory limitation that had the effect of leaving
serious VAT fraud unpunished. This duty was compatible with the principle of
legality in criminal matters enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter, as this
provision did not extend to limitation rules according to the Court. However,
the Italian Constitutional Court warned that the disapplication of the national
limitation rules in question was incompatible with the principle of legality in
the Italian Constitution, which did extend to limitation rules. Thus, a conflict
arose due to the different scopes of the principle of legality in the EU and in the
Italian legal order. This conflict attracted widespread scholarly attention in
Italy.3
The ECJ’s judgment inM.A.S.merits an equal amount of attention, not only
in Italy, but in the entire EU. It is the first judgment in which a conflict between
EU law that was compatible with the Charter and a national fundamental right
was decided in favour of the national right.
1. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, EU:C:1970:114.
2. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v.Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, paras. 58–61. See
e.g. de Boer, “Addressing rights divergences under the Charter:Melloni”, 50 CML Rev. (2013),
1083–1104.
3. See e.g. the more than 30 contributions in Bernardi and Cupelli (Eds.), Il caso Taricco e
il dialogo tra le corti: l’ordinanza 24/2017 della Corte costituzionale (Jovene, 2017).
Common Market Law Review 55: 1521–1548, 2018.
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2. Background
2.1. The ECJ’s judgment in Taricco
The background to the present case lies in the ECJ’s 2015 judgment in
Taricco.4 Taricco and others were accused of having organized a conspiracy to
commit VAT fraud of several million euros. The Italian court that heard the
case asked the ECJ whether the domestic regime of statutory limitation
applicable to this case was compatible with EU law.
The offences committed by Taricco and others were subject to limitation
periods corresponding to the maximum length of imprisonment.5 Under
Italian law, these limitation periods can be interrupted, but they cannot be
extended by more than a quarter of their initial duration in total.6 For example,
an offence with a limitation period of six years is time-barred after seven years
and six months at the latest. As criminal proceedings relating to tax evasion
usually involve long and complex investigations, this limitation regime means
that it is often impossible to convict offenders. According to the referring
court, the offences committed by Taricco and others would become
time-barred before the criminal penalty could be imposed, leading to de facto
impunity.7
The Grand Chamber of the ECJ recalled its judgment in the Åkerberg
Fransson case, in which it had held that the Member States must combat VAT
evasion through effective deterrent measures.8 Collection of VAT affects the
financial interests of the EU since VAT revenue forms part of the EU’s own
resources.9 Serious VAT offences that affect the financial interests of the EU
– such as those committed by Taricco – must be punishable by dissuasive
criminal penalties.10 This duty would be violated if serious VAT fraud escaped
criminal punishment in a considerable number of cases due to offences being
time-barred before the criminal penalty could be imposed.11 In the event that
the national court concluded that the domestic limitation rules had this effect,
it would have to disapply them.12 The ECJ found that disapplication of the
4. Case C-105/14, Criminal proceedings against Ivo Taricco and Others, EU:C:2015:555.
See e.g. Timmerman, “Balancing effective criminal sanctions with effective fundamental rights
protection in cases of VAT fraud: Taricco”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 779–796.
5. Italian Criminal Code, Art. 157.
6. Ibid., Art. 160 read in conjunction with Art. 161.
7. Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 22–24.
8. Ibid., paras. 36–37. See Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson,
EU:C:2013:105, paras. 25–26.
9. Case C-105/14, Taricco, para 38; Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 26.
10. Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 39–43.
11. Ibid., para 47.
12. Ibid., para 49.
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limitation periods in question would not infringe the principle of legality of
criminal offences and penalties enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter.13 Under
this provision, individuals have a right to know, at the time they commit an act
or omission, whether that act or omission is an offence and what penalty is
applicable to it. The limitation period, however, may subsequently be
changed.14
2.2. The preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional Court
In Italy, several courts found that the domestic regime of statutory limitation
did indeed have the effect of leaving serious VAT fraud unsanctioned in a
considerable number of cases.15 However, the Court of Cassation and the
Appellate Court of Milan feared it would be contrary to the Italian
Constitution to disapply the limitation rules in question. For this reason, they
stayed proceedings and referred questions of constitutionality to the Italian
Constitutional Court. The latter, in turn, decided to refer to the ECJ. Order
24/2017 is the third preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional
Court.16
In its preliminary reference, the Italian Constitutional Court confirmed that
the obligation to disregard domestic limitation rules that the ECJ had
identified in Taricco was contrary to Italian constitutional law. According to
the principle of legality in criminal matters of the Italian Constitution, all have
a right to know the limitation period applicable to an offence at the time that
he or she commits it.17 The limitation period cannot be retroactively altered to
the detriment of the individual concerned. In Italy, limitation rules are
therefore considered substantive rules that fall within the scope of the
principle of legality in criminal matters.18 In contrast, the ECJ had given a
more restrictive interpretation to the principle of legality enshrined in
13. Ibid., paras. 54–57.
14. See ibid., para 56.
15. Tega, “Narrowing the dialogue: The Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of
Justice on the prosecution of VAT frauds”, 14 Feb. 2017, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, available at
<www.iconnectblog.com/2017/02/narrowing-the-dialogue-the-italian-constitutional-court-and
-the-court-of-justice-on-the-prosecution-of-vat-frauds/>, (all websites last visited 1 July
2018).
16. Italian Constitutional Court, 26 Jan. 2017, Order 24/2017. An English translation of the
preliminary reference is available on the website of the Italian Constitutional Court, <www.
cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/O_24_2017.pdf>. For an
analysis of the judgment in English, see e.g. Paris, “Carrot and stick: The Italian Constitutional
Court’s preliminary reference in the case Taricco”, (2017) Questions of International Law,
5–20. The other two preliminary references were Italian Constitutional Court, 13 Feb. 2008,
Order 103/2008; Italian Constitutional Court, 18 July 2013, Order 207/2013.
17. Italian Constitution, Art. 25(2); Order 24/2017, section 4.
18. Ibid.
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Article 49 of the Charter; it had treated limitation rules as procedural rules that
fall outside the scope of the principle of legality.19 Hence, the disapplication of
the Italian limitation rules in question was compatible with the right enshrined
in the Charter, but incompatible with the equivalent Italian constitutional
right.
The Italian Constitutional Court intensified this conflict further by
declaring that the principle of legality was a supreme principle of the Italian
constitutional order.20 This meant that it took precedence over conflicting EU
law according to the longstanding controlimiti doctrine of the Italian
Constitutional Court.21 The characterization of the Italian principle of legality
as a supreme principle was therefore an implicit threat to the ECJ. If the ECJ
did not resolve the conflict between the Charter right and the Italian
constitutional right in its preliminary ruling, the Constitutional Court would
rule that the domestic statute giving effect to EU law in Italy is
unconstitutional with regard to the Taricco obligation.22 In effect, this would
mean that the ECJ’s Taricco judgment would be declared incompatible with
the supreme principles of the Italian Constitution. Besides, the Italian
Constitutional Court also equated the supreme principles of the Italian
Constitution with the constitutional identity of the Republic of Italy.23
In the Italian Constitutional Court’s own view, EU law itself did not require
national courts to observe the Taricco obligation, if by doing so they infringed
the supreme principles of the Italian Constitution.24 A number of arguments
were advanced in the preliminary reference to support this claim. In essence,
the Italian Constitutional Court argued that both EU law in general and the
Taricco judgment specifically permitted the application of domestic standards
of fundamental rights protection that are higher than that of the Charter.
To support the claim that EU law in general allowed for higher national
standards of fundamental rights protection, the Italian Constitutional Court
drew on several provisions of primary EU law. It maintained that the diversity
of Member States’ core values was protected by Article 2 TEU (pluralism as
a value on which the EU is founded), Article 4(2) TEU (respect of national
identities), Article 4(3) TEU (principle of sincere cooperation) and Article
6(3) TEU (recognition of domestic constitutional traditions).25 Moreover,
according to the Italian Constitutional Court, Article 53 of the Charter
19. Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 54–56.
20. Order 24/2017, section 2.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., section 8.
24. Ibid., section 6.
25. Ibid.
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authorized Member States to apply standards of fundamental rights protection
that are higher than that of the Charter.26
The Constitutional Court also argued that this interpretation of EU primary
law was not called into question by Taricco. Most notably, paragraph 53 of the
judgment asserted that “if the national court decides to disapply the national
provisions at issue, it must also ensure that the fundamental rights of the
persons concerned are respected”.27 This could only mean that it fell to the
competent national authorities to uphold domestic fundamental rights.28
Furthermore, according to the Constitutional Court, Taricco was clearly
distinct from theMelloni case because it “does not entail any sacrifice to [sic]
the primacy of EU law” to give precedence to Italian constitutional law in the
present case.29 Finally, in Taricco, the ECJ examined the principle of legality
of Article 49 of the Charter only in relation to the prohibition of retroactivity;
it did not examine whether the disapplication of limitation provisions was
governed by legal provisions that are sufficiently precise.30
In conclusion, the Italian Constitutional Court asked the ECJ to confirm
the interpretation of EU law that it had presented in its preliminary reference
and to eliminate the conflict between EU law and Italian constitutional law in
this way.31 It assured that this solution would not alter the obligation of the
Italian legislature to take action urgently in order to ensure the efficacy of
proceedings for VAT fraud.32 The Italian Constitutional Court also requested
that the case be dealt with under the expedited procedure.
3. Opinion ofAdvocate General Bot
Advocate General Bot proposed that the ECJ should not alter the obligation set
out in Taricco, but that it should, rather, clarify when this obligation
applies. The Opinion makes five main claims.33 First, the Advocate General
confirmed and substantiated the Taricco obligation.34 Second, he
acknowledged that the criteria for the disapplication of the limitation
provisions were too vague.35 Third, Advocate General Bot agreed with the
26. Ibid., section 8.
27. Case C-105/14, Taricco, para 53. Cited by Order 24/2017, section 7.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., section 8. See Case C-399/11,Melloni.
30. Order 24/2017, section 9.
31. Ibid., section 10.
32. Ibid., section 7.
33. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-42/17,M.A.S. and M.B., EU:C:2017:564.
34. Ibid., paras. 72–109.
35. Ibid., paras. 110–117.
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ECJ that the immediate disapplication of domestic limitation rules was
compatible with the Charter and the ECHR.36 Fourth, he argued that national
courts could not rely on Article 53 of the Charter to refuse to fulfil the
obligation set out in Taricco.37 Fifth, the Advocate General questioned
whether the immediate disapplication of domestic limitation rules affected
Italy’s national identity.38
As regards, first, the obligation identified in Taricco, the Advocate General
confirmed that domestic courts should disapply domestic limitation periods
that prevent the effective and dissuasive penalization of serious VAT fraud.39
He also investigated the specific Italian limitation provisions in question and
concluded that they were incompatible with the effectiveness of EU law.40 The
ECJ had left this assessment to the Italian courts. Moreover, according to
Advocate General Bot, the limitation rules violated the requirement of Article
6(1) ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter according to which proceedings
should take place within a reasonable time.41 This is a curious argument,
which the ECJ had not made in Taricco. The Advocate General proceeded to
suggest that the ECJ should treat the concept of interruption of the limitation
period as an autonomous concept of EU law; another idea that the ECJ had not
considered.42
In the second part of his analysis, the Advocate General examined the
circumstances in which national courts are required to disapply national
limitation rules. He agreed with the Italian Constitutional Court that the
criteria identified by the ECJ in Tariccowere too “vague and generic”.43 Only
the seriousness of the offence, to be defined by the EU legislature, and not the
number of cases should determine the obligation to disapply national rules.44
Third, the Advocate General confirmed that the immediate disapplication
of domestic limitation rules was compatible with Article 49 of the Charter and
Article 7 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.45
In the fourth part of the Opinion, Advocate General Bot argued that Article
53 of the Charter did not allow national courts to disregard the obligation
identified by the ECJ in Taricco on the grounds that domestic constitutional
law provided for a higher standard of protection.46 Repeating his observations
in Melloni, the Advocate General emphasized that the specific nature of EU
36. Ibid., paras. 123–143.
37. Ibid., paras. 144–168.
38. Ibid., paras. 169–187.
39. Ibid., para 188.
40. Ibid., paras. 85–87.
41. Ibid., paras. 89 and 100.
42. Ibid., paras. 100–102.
43. Ibid., para 111.
44. Ibid., paras. 14 and 116–117.
45. Ibid., paras. 126–140.
46. Ibid., paras. 16 and 188.
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law meant that the level of protection under the Charter had to be determined
autonomously for the specific context of EU law.47 Under the principle
identified by the ECJ in Melloni, the Member States were free to apply
national standards of fundamental rights protection only if the primacy, unity
and effectiveness of EU law were not thereby compromised, and these
conditions were not fulfilled in the present case.48
In the fifth and final part of the analysis, the Advocate General claimed that
the immediate application of longer limitation periods did not affect Italy’s
constitutional identity.49 The Italian Constitutional Court had not given
convincing reasons to substantiate why the immediate application of longer
limitation periods concerned its national identity.50
4. The judgment
The ECJ processed the M.A.S. case under the expedited procedure of Article
105(1) of the Rules of Procedure, as the Italian Constitutional Court had
requested. The judgment was delivered about a year after the preliminary
reference of the Italian Constitutional Court. The reasoning of the ECJ,
summarized here, can be criticized for its lack of clarity.51
The central finding of the judgment is that Article 325 TFEU does not
require national courts to disapply limitation rules that are part of national
substantive law if this would breach the principle of legality.52 This principle
could be infringed “because of the lack of precision of the applicable law or
because of the retroactive application of legislation imposing conditions of
criminal liability stricter than those in force at the time the infringement was
committed”.53
The ECJ started with some preliminary observations on the preliminary
ruling procedure of Article 267 TFEU. It emphasized that this procedure
consists in “a dialogue” between itself and the courts of the Member States and
that it is an “an instrument of cooperation”.54 When answering questions for a
preliminary ruling, the ECJ must rely on the factual and legal context as
47. Ibid., paras. 148–153. See Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-399/11, Melloni,
EU:C:2012:600, para 109.
48. Opinion, paras. 158–163.
49. Ibid., para 17.
50. Ibid., para 180.
51. On this criticism, see section 5.5. infra.
52. Judgment, paras. 61–62.
53. Ibid., para 62.
54. Ibid., paras. 22–23.
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described in the order for reference.55 The Court noted that the Italian
understanding of the principle of legality in criminal matters had not been
drawn to its attention in the Taricco case.56 Thus, in the present case, it had to
clarify the interpretation of the obligation set out in Tariccowith respect to the
principle of legality of the Italian Constitution.
Next, the ECJ repeated its findings in Taricco. It recalled that the Member
States must counter illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU
through effective and deterrent measures.57 Serious VAT fraud must be
punishable by dissuasive criminal penalties.58 In Taricco, the ECJ had drawn
these obligations from Article 325 TFEU, the VAT Directive, read in
conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, and the PFI Convention.59 In M.A.S, it
invoked only Article 325 TFEU, which obliges the Member States to counter
fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the
Union through effective and deterrent measures. As in Taricco, the ECJ found
that this provision of primary law had direct effect.60 It was therefore for the
national courts to give full effect to it by disapplying conflicting national
limitation rules.61
The ECJ noted that the protection of the financial interests of the EU
through criminal penalties fell within the shared competences of the EU and
the Member States.62 Since the EU legislature had not harmonized the
limitation rules applicable to criminal proceedings relating to VAT at the
material time of the main proceedings, Italy was free to ensure that these rules
formed part of substantive criminal law for the purpose of the principle of
legality.63 The national courts, for their part, have to ensure that the
fundamental rights of the accused are upheld when disapplying domestic
limitation rules for violation of EU law.64 As the ECJ had already held in
Åkerberg Fransson and the case law cited there, “national authorities and
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental
rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as
55. Ibid., para 24.
56. Ibid., para 28.
57. Ibid., para 30. See Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, paras. 25–26; Case C-105/14,
Taricco, paras. 36–37.
58. Judgment, para 34. See Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 39–43.
59. Council Directive 2006/112/EC (VAT Directive), O.J. 2006, L 347/1; Convention drawn
up on the basis of Article K.3 of the TEU, on the protection of the European Communities’
financial interests (PFI Convention), O.J. 1995, 316/49.
60. Judgment, para 38. See Case C-105/14, Taricco, para 51.
61. Judgment, paras. 39–40.
62. Ibid., para 43.
63. Ibid., paras. 44–45.
64. Ibid., para 46.
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interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law
are not thereby compromised”.65
Moreover, the ECJ re-examined the principle that offences and penalties
must be defined by law. It recalled that this principle of EU law was protected
by Article 49 of the Charter and by the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States.66 According to the Explanations related to the Charter,Article
49 of the Charter had the same meaning and scope as the equivalent ECHR
right, namely Article 7(1) ECHR.67 The scope of this ECHR provision did not
extend to limitation rules, as the case law of the ECtHR showed.68 The ECJ
also referred to its own case law, which suggested that both safeguards
inherent in the principle of legality – the requirement that the applicable law
must be precise and the principle of non-retroactivity – did not extend to
limitation rules.69
However, in the Italian legal system, these safeguards did apply to limitation
rules for criminal offences relating to VAT.70 Therefore, the national court
would not have to comply with the obligation set out in Taricco, if it
considered that this obligation conflicted with the principle of legality.71 It
would then be the task of the Italian legislature to lay down limitation rules that
are compatible with EU law.72
5. Comment
The judgment inM.A.S. is remarkable because the ECJ allowed Italian courts
to breach an obligation of EU law in order to uphold the principle of legality
as it is interpreted in the Italian legal order. This comment focuses on the
constitutional issues arising from the judgment, as the criminal punishment of
VAT fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU has already been
addressed in other case notes.73 It examines five key issues: the distinction
65. Ibid., para 47. See Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 29; Case C-399/11,
Melloni, para 60.
66. Judgment, paras. 52–53.
67. Ibid., para 54.
68. Ibid., para 55.
69. Ibid., paras. 56–57.
70. Ibid., para 58.
71. Ibid., para 61.
72. Ibid., paras. 61 and 41–42.
73. See especially Timmerman, op. cit. supra note 4; Billis, “The European Court of
Justice: A ‘quasi-constitutional court’ in criminal matters? The Taricco judgment and its
shortcomings”, (2016) NJECL, 20–38; Giuffrida, “The limitation period of crimes: Same old
Italian story, new intriguing European answers: Case note on C-105/14, Taricco”, (2016)
NJECL, 100–112.
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between complete and partial determination by EU law that is relevant for the
applicability of national fundamental rights within the scope of EU law (5.1.),
the role of the Charter as a minimum standard of protection (5.2.), the
techniques the ECJ used to avoid the impression that it overruled Taricco
(5.3.), the reasons why the ECJ did not need to discuss constitutional identity
in this case (5.4.) and the quality and persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning
and decision (5.5.).
5.1. Complete v. partial determination by EU law
The problem inM.A.S. was that an obligation of EU law that was in line with
the Charter conflicted with a national constitutional right. The ECJ had made
some general statements on how such conflicts are to be resolved in its 2013
judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson.74 In particular, it had
distinguished two types of situations, one in which national fundamental
rights can be applied within the scope of EU law and another in which only the
Charter rights can be applied. This distinction remains valid. In M.A.S., the
national court was permitted to apply a national standard of fundamental
rights protection because the national measure at issue was not completely
determined by EU law in the view of the ECJ (5.1.1.). It seemed to matter that
the national limitation rules in question had not been harmonized by the EU
legislature (5.1.2.). However, M.A.S. is fundamentally different from other
cases in which the ECJ permitted the application of a higher domestic
standard of fundamental rights protection. In the present case, there was a
direct conflict between EU law and the Italian constitutional right. The Court
resolved this conflict by exceptionally allowing a breach of EU law to persist
in the interest of the overriding principle of legality (5.1.3.).
5.1.1. Melloni, Åkerberg Fransson and the primacy, unity and
effectiveness of EU law
In Melloni, the ECJ held that Article 53 of the Charter did not alter the
primacy of EU law over domestic constitutional law.75 As it is well known, EU
law prevails over conflicting constitutional law of Member States, pursuant to
the principle of primacy.76 The Charter did not introduce an exception to this
longstanding principle when it became legally binding with the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.77Melloni made clear that Article 53 of
74. Case C-399/11,Melloni; Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.
75. See Case C-399/11,Melloni, paras. 58–61.
76. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. See also Case C-409/06, Winner
Wetten GmbH v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, EU:C:2010:503, para 61.
77. Art. 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter has the “same legal value as the Treaties”.
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the Charter does not authorize Member States to give precedence to a
domestic standard of fundamental rights protection that is higher than that of
the Charter.78
In return, the ECJ acknowledged that national fundamental rights could be
applied within the scope of application of the Charter under certain
circumstances. It reassured the Member States that the applicability of the
Charter did not automatically entail that national fundamental rights could not
be applied. In particular, it found:
“It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal
act calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by
the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and
effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised.”79
The ECJ repeated this statement almost word-for-word in its judgment in
Åkerberg Fransson, which is famous for establishing that the Charter is
applicable whenever EU law is applicable.80 Furthermore, it added that
national authorities remained free to apply domestic fundamental rights “in a
situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by
European Union law”.81 Arguably, this meant that the application of domestic
fundamental rights affected the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law,
only if the national measure at issue was completely determined by EU law.
However, the ECJ did not specify what it meant by “not entirely determined”
by EU law and it did not explain under what circumstances the primacy, unity
and effectiveness of EU law would be compromised.
InM.A.S., the ECJ remarked that Member States are free to apply national
fundamental rights provided the level of protection of the Charter and the
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised and
it referred to Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni in this context.82 It did so after
having pointed out that the national limitation rules at issue had not been
harmonized by the EU legislature at the time in question.83 This suggests that
78. Case C-399/11,Melloni, paras. 56–57.
79. Ibid., para 60.
80. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 29. Åkerberg Fransson established that the
Charter is a “shadow” of EU law. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, “The place of the Charter in the
EU constitutional edifice” in Peers et al. (Eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart
Publishing, 2014), pp. 1559–1594, pp. 1567–1568.
81. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 29.
82. Judgment, para 47. The Court referred to Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 29
and the case law cited. The only case cited there is C-399/11,Melloni, para 60.
83. Judgment, paras. 44–45.
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the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law were left intact in the present
case. The standard of protection provided for by the Charter was obviously
respected, as the Italian principle of legality offered higher protection for the
individual than the equivalent Charter right.84 Hence, the ECJ presented
M.A.S. as an example of a case in which the application of a higher domestic
standard of fundamental rights protection was permissible under EU law. It
did not modify the conflict rules it had developed in Melloni and Åkerberg
Fransson, but it presented M.A.S. as a specific application of these rules.85
The ECJ therefore abstained from reconsidering or nuancing its ruling in
Melloni, according to which Article 53 of the Charter does not affect the
primacy of EU law over domestic constitutional law. The Italian
Constitutional Court had invited the ECJ to depart from this finding by
claiming that this provision – read in the light of the related Explanation –
provided that a higher domestic level of fundamental rights protection must be
safeguarded.86 However, the ECJ did not follow this request.
5.1.2. The criterion of harmonization by secondary legislation
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not explain why the national court was allowed to
apply the national standard of fundamental rights protection in the present
case. However, the Court’s reasoning suggests that the absence of
harmonization by EU secondary legislation was a significant reason for the
concession to the national court. It mattered that the EU legislature had not
introduced common standards for limitation rules in criminal proceedings for
VAT fraud affecting the EU’s own financial interests.
Before it referred to Åkerberg Fransson andMelloni, the ECJ noted that the
enactment of criminal penalties for the protection of the financial interests of
84. But see Burchardt, “Kehrtwende in der Grundrechts- und Vorrangrechtsprechung des
EuGH? Anmerkung zum Urt. des EuGH vom 5.12.2017 in der RechtssacheM.A.S. und M.B.”,
(2018) EuR, 248–263, 255. Burchardt argues that paras. 58–45 might mean that not only a
higher national standard of fundamental rights protection, but every national standard of
protection could prevail over the Charter.
85. See also Pollicino and Bassini, “Defusing the Taricco bomb through fostering
constitutional tolerance”, 5 Dec. 2017, Verfassungsblog, available at <verfassungsblog.de/de
fusing-the-taricco-bomb-through-fostering-constitutional-tolerance-all-roads-lead-to-rome/>;
Sarmiento, “To bow at the rhythm of an Italian tune”, 5 Dec. 2017, Despite our Differences
Blog, available at <despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2017/12/05/to-bow-at-the-rhy
thm-of-an-italian-tune/>. But see Burchardt, op. cit. supra note 84, 254; Krajewski,
“‘Conditional primacy’ of EU law and its deliberative value: An imperfect illustration from
Taricco II”, 18. Dec. 2017, European Law Blog, available at <europeanlawblog.eu/2017/12/18/
conditional-primacy-of-eu-law-and-its-deliberative-value-an-imperfect-illustration-from-taric
co-ii/>. Burchardt and Krajewski doubt that the ECJ gave effect to the Melloni and Åkerberg
Fransson doctrine in M.A.S.
86. Order 24/2017, section 8.
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the EU fell within the shared competence of the EU and the Member States
within the meaning of Article 4(2)TFEU.87 Moreover, it stated: “in the present
case, at the material time for the main proceedings, the limitation rules
applicable to criminal proceedings relating to VAT had not been harmonized
by the EU legislature, and harmonization has since taken place only to a partial
extent …”.88
Rather than by EU secondary legislation, the national limitation rules were
governed by a directly effective provision of primary legislation, namely
Article 325 TFEU.89 This provision does not specifically regulate limitation
rules in criminal proceedings relating to VAT. It stipulates only a general
obligation for the Union and the Member States to counter fraud and other
illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU through effective
and deterrent measures. In Taricco, the ECJ found that Article 325 TFEU
established a concrete duty for national courts to disapply national limitation
rules that had the effect of leaving serious VAT fraud unpunished in a
considerable number of cases.90 Yet, this duty, resulting from the broadly
termed Article 325 TFEU, was apparently not sufficient to consider the
national limitation rules in question as being completely determined by EU
law for the purpose of the application of national fundamental rights. The
national court was allowed to apply the higher domestic standard of
fundamental rights protection because the national limitation periods had not
been harmonized by specific secondary legislation.
The lack of harmonization by the EU legislature distinguishesM.A.S. from
Melloni. The Italian Constitutional Court argued that M.A.S. was “clearly
distinct” fromMelloni.91 It found that, in the present case, giving precedence
to Italian constitutional law “does not entail any sacrifice to [sic] the primacy
of EU law”, although it did not provide any convincing reason for this claim.92
The ECJ, for its part, did not explicitly distinguish M.A.S. from Melloni.
Nevertheless, its emphasis on harmonization by the EU legislature points to an
important difference between the two cases. In Melloni, the standard of
protection of fair trial rights for trials in absence was harmonized at the EU
level by secondary legislation. Article 4a(1) of the European Arrest Warrant
(EAW) Framework Decision governed the execution of EAWs in case of a
conviction in absentia and it demanded the surrender of Mr Melloni to Italy,
87. Judgment, para 43. In contrast, the Italian Constitutional Court considered that
limitation rules are not a matter of EU competence. Order 24/2017, section 6.
88. Judgment, para 44.
89. Direct effect of Art. 325(1) TFEU: ibid., para 38. See also Case C-105/14, Taricco,
para 51.
90. Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 47–49. See section 2.1. supra.
91. Order 24/2017, section 8.
92. Ibid.
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since he had been aware of his trial.93 The Spanish Constitutional Court could
not oppose this surrender, even though that is what would have been required
to give effect to Mr Melloni’s fair trial rights under the Spanish Constitution.94
InM.A.S., on the other hand, the standard of fundamental rights protection had
not been harmonized by the EU legislature; the national limitation rules were
governed directly by Article 325 TFEU.
However, the absence of specific harmonization of the national measure in
question by secondary legislation is not the only difference between M.A.S.
andMelloni. First, the function of criminal law in the two areas of EU law at
issue can be distinguished. The VAT law of the EU serves the economic and
financial interests of the EU; criminal law is used merely as an instrument to
promote these interests.95 In the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and in
particular as far as the EAW is concerned, the goal is cooperation between
Member States in the field of criminal justice.96 This difference could be
another explanation for the different treatment ofM.A.S. andMelloni. Second,
M.A.S.was an internal case, whereasMelloni – as any EAW case – involved a
cross-border element. In Melloni, a uniform standard of fundamental rights
protection was crucial for the overall efficacy of the EAW system, which is
based on mutual recognition.97
5.1.3. Breach of EU law allowed to persist
M.A.S. was the first ECJ case in which a conflict between EU law that was
compatible with the Charter and a national fundamental right was decided in
favour of the national right.98 According to the ECJ’s interpretation of Article
325 TFEU in Taricco, there was a clear conflict between this directly effective
provision of primary law and the Italian limitation rules in question.99 In the
event of such a conflict, the principle of primacy would require that the
national legal provision is disapplied, irrespective of the form or time of entry
of this national provision.100 Nevertheless, the Court found that the national
court was not obliged to comply with the Taricco obligation, if it came to the
conclusion that this obligation was incompatible with the principle that
93. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (EAW Framework Decision), O.J. 2002, L
190/1; Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA amending Framework Decisions
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, O.J. 2009,
L 81/24; Case C-399/11,Melloni, paras. 35–64.
94. Case C-399/11,Melloni, paras. 55–64.
95. See e.g. VAT Directive, cited supra note 59, recitals 4 and 8.
96. See e.g. EAW Framework Decision, cited supra note 93, recital 6.
97. See Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 63.
98. See also Burchardt, op. cit. supra note 84, 256.
99. See also Timmerman, op. cit. supra note 4, 794; Burchardt, op. cit. supra note 84, 256.
100. See Avbelj, “Supremacy or primacy of EU Law: (Why) does it matter?”, 17 ELJ
(2011), 744–763, 751.
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offences and penalties must be defined by law.101 The ECJ also accepted that
the effectiveness of EU law was adversely affected, as VAT fraud affecting the
financial interests of the EU might not be punished in a considerable number
of cases.
The judgment differs from the Advocate General’s Opinion in this regard.
Bot argued that the primacy of EU law was compromised by the application of
the limitation rules in question, because an obstacle was placed in the way of
an obligation, identified by the ECJ, that was compatible with the Charter.102
Moreover, the effectiveness of EU law was compromised, insofar as the
offences in question affected the financial interests of the EU.103 The
Advocate General therefore concluded that the national court could not refuse
to fulfil the obligation identified by the ECJ in Taricco.104
As there was a conflict between EU law and national law, M.A.S. was
fundamentally different from Jeremy F., another case in which the ECJ
permitted the application of a higher domestic standard of fundamental rights
protection. In this case, the national authorities were free to provide for an
appeal with suspensive effect against decisions relating to an EAW to uphold
domestic constitutional rights, because the EAW Framework Decision left
them a degree of discretion in this regard.105 However, they could apply the
domestic standard of fundamental rights protection only on the condition that
the requirements of the EAW Framework Decision were not frustrated.106
This meant that the Member States were free to apply national standards of
fundamental rights protection only insofar as an instrument of EU secondary
legislation left them a degree of discretion.107 The Taricco obligation,
however, did not leave any discretion to the national courts; it was in direct
conflict with the Italian principle of legality in criminal matters.
The implications of the ruling in M.A.S. for future cases remain unclear
because the ECJ failed to clarify its motivations. According to one
interpretation of the judgment, the ECJ introduced a new exception to the
primacy principle.108 Combined with the interpretation according to which
specific harmonization by secondary legislation is a significant criterion, this
reading would imply the following rules: firstly, if a national measure is only
101. Judgment, para 61.
102. Opinion, para 166.
103. Ibid., para 167.
104. Ibid., para 168.
105. Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. v. Premier ministre, EU:C:2013:358, paras. 51–53.
106. Ibid., para 53; EAW Framework Decision, cited supra note 93.
107. Millet, “How much lenience for how much cooperation? On the first preliminary
reference of the French Constitutional Council to the Court of Justice”, 51 CML Rev. (2014),
195–218, 213.
108. This is the interpretation favoured by Burchardt, op. cit. supra note 84, 256.
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partially determined by EU law, a higher domestic standard of fundamental
rights protection can be applied without compromising the primacy, unity and
effectiveness of EU law and second, partial determination can take two forms:
EU secondary law leaves a degree of discretion to Member States, as in
Jeremy F.; or the national measure at issue is determined merely by a broadly
termed provision of primary legislation and has not been harmonized by
secondary legislation.
Another interpretation would be that the ECJ, exceptionally, allowed a
breach of EU law to persist because this was justified by the overriding
principle of legality. M.A.S. was not the first case in which the ECJ accepted
that national rules are applied, even though their disapplication would have
ended a situation that was incompatible with EU law. Under certain
circumstances, the full effect of the principle of primacy in the Member States
can be moderated to uphold other primary interests of EU or national law.109
The ECJ itself referred to Impresa Pizzarotti, a judgment in which it had
allowed a breach of EU law to persist in order to safeguard the principle of res
judicata, which was protected both in the EU and the national legal orders,
according to the Court.110 In this case and in a number of others, the Court held
that EU law did not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of
procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if this meant allowing a
breach of EU law to persist.111 Moreover, Winner Wetten suggested that the
principle of legal certainty could justify a national provision that was
incompatible with EU law continuing to be applied during a transitional
period so as to avoid a legal vacuum, albeit only under narrowly defined
conditions.112 Building on Winner Wetten, the ECJ held that overriding
considerations linked to environmental protection could exceptionally justify
maintaining the effects of national law that conflicts with EU law.113 It makes
sense to readM.A.S. in light of this case law and to assume that a breach of EU
109. For a more extensive discussion of the relevant case law, see Sowery, “Reconciling
primacy and environmental protection: Association France Nature Environnement”, 54 CML
Rev. (2017), 1157–1177, at 1163–1170; Kaczorowska-Ireland, European Union Law
(Routledge, 2013), pp. 287–292.
110. Judgment, para 61. The ECJ referred to Case C-213/13, Impresa Pizzarotti & C. SpA
v. Comune di Bari and Others, EU:C:2014:2067, paras. 58–59.
111. Case C-213/13, Impresa Pizzarotti, paras. 59–60. See also Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss
China Time Ltd v. Benetton International N.V., EU:C:1999:269, paras. 46–47; Case C-234/04,
Rosmarie Kapferer v. Schlank & Schick GmbH, EU:C:2006:178, paras. 20–21; Case C-40/08,
Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, EU:C:2009:615, paras.
35–37. For restrictions imposed on the precedence of the principle of res judicata, see e.g. Case
C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz, EU:C:2004:17; Case C-119/05, Ministero dell’Industria, del
Commercio e dell’Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA, EU:C:2007:434.
112. Case C-409/06,Winner Wetten, para 66.
113. Case C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL and Terre wallonne ASBL v.
Région wallonne, EU:C:2012:103, para 58; Case C-379/15, Association France Nature
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law was exceptionally allowed to persist to respect the overriding principle of
legality, in particular because the Court explicitly referred to Impresa
Pizzarotti.
5.2. The Charter as a minimum standard
The ECJ referred to both the principle of legality of the Charter and the
principle of legality of the Italian legal order. However, it failed to clarify how
the two variants of the principle of legality related to each other in this case and
on which of them the national court could rely.114 After a number of
observations on the meaning and scope of Article 49 of the Charter, the ECJ
suddenly switched to discussing only the Italian principle of legality, without
explaining this transition.115 Although the Court’s reasoning in this part of the
judgment is particularly opaque, it seems to imply that the national court
should combine Article 49 of the Charter and the Italian principle of legality
by extending the scope of the Charter right to limitation rules, in this specific
case. In this way, the Charter was used as a minimum standard of protection.
The ECJ apparently maintained its previous interpretation of Article 49 of
the Charter and refrained from extending the scope of this provision to
limitation rules. It emphasized that the Charter right had the same meaning
and scope as Article 7(1) ECHR and noted that the scope of the ECHR right
extended to the definition of offences and the determination of the penalty.116
This indicates that neither Article 7(1) ECHR, nor Article 49 of the Charter,
extended to limitation rules in the ECJ’s view. The Court also recalled two of
its own judgments, suggesting that only the definition of the offence and the
determination of the penalty were subject to the principle of legality of the
Charter.117
Thus, the ECJ did not Europeanize the Italian interpretation of the principle
of legality by giving Article 49 of the Charter a more extensive scope than
Article 7(1) ECHR.118 It would have had the option to do so on the basis of
Article 52(3) of the Charter, which stipulates that the EU can provide more
Environnement v.Premier ministre andMinistre de l’Écologie, duDéveloppement durable et de
l’Énergie, EU:C:2016:603, para 43.
114. Burchardt, op. cit. supra note 84, 252; Wegner, “Vorhang zu und alle Fragen offen?
Zum Verhältnis von nationalem Verfassungsrecht und unmittelbar anwendbarem Unionsrecht
nach Taricco II”, 20 Dec. 2017, JuWiss Blog, available at <www.juwiss.de/143-2017/>.
115. Start of the observations on the Italian principle of legality: Judgment, para 58.
116. Ibid., paras. 54–55.
117. Ibid., paras. 56–57.
118. In favour of this alternative approach: Rossi, “How could the ECJ escape from the
Taricco quagmire?”, 21 Apr. 2017, Verfassungsblog, available at <verfassungsblog.de/
how-could-the-ecj-escape-from-the-taricco-quagmire/>, Bassini and Pollicino, “The opinion
of Advocate General Bot in Taricco II: Seven ‘deadly’ sins and a modest proposal”, 2 Aug.
Case C-42/17 1537
extensive protection than the ECHR for a corresponding right. To justify the
sudden change of its interpretation of Article 49 of the Charter, the Court
could have invoked Article 52(4) of the Charter, arguing that its new
knowledge of the Italian principle of legality motivated a different
interpretation of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States
and therefore of Article 49 of the Charter. A constitutional tradition does not
have to be common to the majority of the Member States to guide the
interpretation of a Charter right.119 Alternatively, the Court could have argued
that Article 49 of the Charter provided for a broader principle of legality in
criminal matters, which goes beyond the prohibition of retroactivity discussed
inTaricco, and that this principle generally requires that all rules must be clear,
precise and foreseeable.120 However, the ECJ preferred to give Article 49 of
the Charter the same scope as it had given it in Taricco; this was a reasonable
choice. First, it thereby avoided contradicting Taricco. Second, the standard of
fundamental rights protection of one Member State is not necessarily best
suited for the EU as a whole.121
Instead of extending the scope of Article 49 of the Charter, the ECJ
permitted the national court to use the Charter as a minimum, rather than
maximum, standard of protection by combining it with the Italian principle of
legality.122 The national court had to respect the requirements of
foreseeability, precision and non-retroactivity inherent in the principle of
legality, derived from the Court’s own case law.123 It seems that the national
court was instructed to apply these requirements of the Charter to limitation
2017, Verfassungsblog, available at <verfassungsblog.de/the-opinion-of-advocate-general-
bot-in-taricco-ii-seven-deadly-sins-and-a-modest-proposal/>.
119. Schumann, “Grenzenlose Freiheit für den EuGH? Zur legitimierenden und bindenden
Kraft wertender Rechtsvergleichung”, 18 Journal für Rechtspolitik (2010), 240–245, 244;
Obwexer, “Funktionalität und Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung in der Rechtsprechung des
EuGH” in Gamper and Verschraegen (Eds.), Rechtsvergleichung als juristische
Auslegungsmethode (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2013), pp. 115–139, p. 130.
120. See Opinion of A.G. Bobek in Case C-574/15, Criminal proceedings against Mauro
Scialdone, EU:C:2017:553, paras. 146–161.
121. See already Weiler, “Fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries” in Neuwahl
and Rosas (Eds.), The EuropeanUnion andHuman Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995),
pp. 51–76, p. 59. The A.G. mentioned some Member States in which limitation rules are
considered procedural rules and others in which they are considered substantive criminal law.
Opinion, note 13.
122. On floors and ceilings in multi-layered systems of protection, see Fabbrini,
Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective
(OUP, 2014), pp. 37–47.
123. Judgment, paras. 55–58. See Case C-72/15, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. Her
Majesty’s Treasury and Others, EU:C:2017:236, para 162; Case C-554/14, Criminal
proceedings against Ognyanov, EU:C:2016:835, paras. 63–64. The requirement of
foreseeability was developed by the ECtHR and it overlaps with the requirements of precision
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rules.124 The Charter and the national right had to be applied in parallel
through a combination of the meaning of Article 49 of the Charter and the
scope of the Italian principle of legality. This combination ensured the best
protection for the individuals concerned by giving effect to the national
standard of protection, while respecting the minimum level of protection
provided for by the Charter, as required byMelloni and Åkerberg Fransson.125
Even though the requirement of precision seemed to derive from the
Charter, the ECJ did not itself determine whether the Taricco obligation was
precise enough. It left this determination entirely to the national court.126
Taricco does not provide guidance in this regard either. As the Italian
Constitutional Court noted in its reference, in Taricco, the ECJ had examined
the principle of legality of Article 49 of the Charter only in relation to the
prohibition of retroactivity, but not in relation to the principle of precision.127
5.3. Reinterpretation of Taricco
In Taricco, the ECJ had found that the national court would have to disapply
national limitation rules that had the effect of leaving serious VAT fraud
unpunished in a considerable number of cases, and that this duty was in
conformity with Article 49 of the Charter.128 In M.A.S., it held that the
national court could continue to apply national limitation rules that had this
effect, if they conflicted with the principle that offences and penalties must be
defined by law.129 The Court obviously changed its approach and gave greater
weight to the principle of legality inM.A.S.At the same time, it sought to avoid
the impression that it overturned Taricco. Even though not all the arguments
advanced by the Court with this aim are equally convincing, it is true that
M.A.S. does not directly contradict Taricco. Moreover, the Court rightly
emphasized that it would have been for the referring court in Taricco to point
out the constitutional obstacles that were later articulated by the Italian
Constitutional Court.
To emphasize that the duties of the Member States under Article 325 TFEU
had not changed, the ECJ repeated the relevant findings of Taricco almost
and non-retroactivity of the Charter. Mitsilegas, “Principles of legality and proportionality of
criminal offences and penalties” in Peers et al., op. cit. supra note 80, pp. 1351–1372,
pp. 1360–1361.
124. Judgment, paras. 59–60.
125. Case C-399/11, Melloni, para 60; Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para 29. See
section 5.1.1. supra.
126. Judgment, para 59.
127. Order 24/2017, section 9.
128. Case C-105/14, Taricco, paras. 49–57.
129. Judgment, para 61.
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verbatim.130 As mentioned above, it also maintained its previous
interpretation of Article 49 of the Charter and it presentedM.A.S. as a specific
application of the Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson doctrine.131
Furthermore, the Court cited its holding in Taricco that the competent
national courts “must also ensure that the fundamental rights of the persons
concerned are respected”.132 The Italian Constitutional Court had interpreted
this statement to mean that national fundamental rights need to be respected
when giving effect to the Taricco obligation.133 It had therefore shown the ECJ
a way out of its dilemma. However, it is doubtful whether the ECJ was actually
referring to national fundamental rights in this passage of Taricco. It did not
mention national fundamental rights at all in this paragraph, and it devoted all
of its attention to Article 49 of the Charter in the subsequent paragraphs.
Moreover, the operative part of Taricco suggested that the obligation to
disapply national limitation rules had to be observed unconditionally.134 Yet,
the ECJ did not explicitly exclude that national fundamental rights could
hinder the enforcement of the Taricco obligation. For this reason, the ECJ
changed its approach, but it did not directly overturn Taricco.135
The ECJ explained its lack of consideration of national fundamental rights
in Taricco by blaming the referring court in this case. It emphasized that the
preliminary ruling procedure consists of a “dialogue” between itself and the
courts of the Member States.136 In particular, it noted that the specific
understanding of the principle of legality under Italian constitutional law had
not been drawn to its attention by the referring court in Taricco.137 Likewise,
Advocate General Bot maintained that “it would be unfair to be too critical of
the Court” for not having considered the impact of its Taricco ruling in Italy,
since neither the referring court nor the Italian Government, in its written and
oral observations, had referred to the particular features of the Italian principle
of legality.138
It is hard to believe that the ECJ was completely unaware of the scope of the
principle of legality under Italian constitutional law, since some of the
questions at the oral hearing had related to the substantive or procedural
character of limitation rules in Italy. Nevertheless, the ECJ was right to insist
130. Ibid., paras. 30–40.
131. See sections 5.1.1. and 5.2. supra.
132. Judgment, para 46. See Case C-105/14, Taricco, para 53.
133. Order 24/2017, section 7.
134. Timmerman, op. cit. supra note 4, 794; Krajewski, op. cit. supra note 85.
135. See also Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 85.Against, Pollicino and Bassini, op. cit. supra
note 85. The authors argue that the ECJ’s conclusion inM.A.S. is in conflict with its position in
Taricco.
136. Judgment, paras. 22–23.
137. Ibid., para 28.
138. Opinion, para 69.
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that the preliminary reference procedure relies on cooperation between itself
and national judges. It was, indeed, the task of the referring court in Taricco to
describe the relevant legal background in the order for reference.139
The referring court’s failure to discuss eventual constitutional obstacles to
the enforcement of EU law can be explained by the distribution of
responsibilities between courts in Italy. In Member States that adhere to a
centralized system of constitutional review, such as Italy, ordinary courts are
not the ultimate guardians of the constitution, but this role falls to
constitutional courts.140 Besides, national governments are not the best
advocates for national constitutional law either, in particular because the latter
imposes limits on their own actions.141 A sensible way to address this concern
would be to change the Statute of the ECJ to allow constitutional courts to
intervene as third parties.142 However, it would have to be ensured that such a
change does not disadvantage Member States that do not have a constitutional
court.
5.4. Constitutional identity
The Italian Constitutional Court claimed that the principle of legality was a
supreme principle of the Italian constitutional order, which meant that it took
precedence over EU law according to the controlimiti doctrine.143 Moreover,
it equated the supreme principles of the Italian constitutional order with Italy’s
constitutional identity and it noted that Article 4(2)TEU aimed to preserve the
national identity of the Member States.144 By adopting the terminology of
constitutional identity, the Italian Constitutional Court followed the example
of the German Federal Constitutional Court.145 It was obviously looking to
find a legal basis for its own controlimiti case law in EU primary legislation.
139. Art. 94(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ.
140. De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart
Publishing, 2014), p. 54; Mayer, “Multilevel constitutional jurisdiction” in von Bogdandy and
Bast (Eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 399–440,
at 400–401.
141. Rauchegger, “The interplay between the Charter and national constitutions after
Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni” in de Vries et al. (Eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights as a Binding Instrument (Hart Publishing, 2015), pp. 93–131, at 117.
142. De Visser, “National constitutional courts, the Court of Justice and the protection of
fundamental rights in a post-Charter landscape”, 15 Human Rights Review (2014), 39–51, 48.
See Art. 23 of the Statute of the ECJ.
143. Order 24/2017, section 2.
144. Ibid., sections 6 and 8.
145. BVerfG, 30 Jun. 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, Treaty of Lisbon; BVerfG, 15 Dec. 2015, 2 BvR
2735/14, Solange III.
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However, as in Melloni, the ECJ did not discuss constitutional or national
identity at all.146 It did not need to do so because it resolved the conflict
between the Taricco obligation and the Italian principle of legality by treating
the Charter as a minimum standard of protection. It seems that the ECJ is not
prepared to accept that the constitutional identity of a Member State justifies
exceptions to the principle of primacy.
Although it is unfortunate that the ECJ did not address the correct
interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU, it rightly avoided resolving the conflict
between EU law and Italian constitutional law by introducing an exception to
primacy in favour of national constitutional identity. First, Article 4(2) TEU
should not be interpreted as a derogation clause to the primacy principle, on
which national courts can rely to disregard EU law.147 The identity clause is
addressed to the EU, not to Member States; it requires EU institutions,
including the ECJ, to respect the national identity of Member States.148 The
ECJ certainly complied with this requirement by allowing the national court to
apply the principle of legality to limitation provisions.
Second, the ECJ would have needed to rely on the assessment of the Italian
Constitutional Court, according to which the specific Italian understanding of
the principle of legality in criminal matters was part of the national identity of
this Member State. Even though a number of Italian scholars did in fact
question this assessment, it would not have been the task of the ECJ to
interpret the constitution of a Member State.149 The Advocate General was
wrong to do so.150
Third, in the current political climate, it would be risky to encourage
national authorities to rely on Article 4(2) TEU as an exception to primacy, as
the example of the Hungarian Constitutional Court illustrated.151 The
advantage of the approach chosen by the ECJ in M.A.S. is that it will be for
the Court itself to determine whether the conditions for the application of the
national standard of fundamental rights protection are fulfilled in future cases.
146. Case C-399/11,Melloni.
147. Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (OUP, 2015), pp. 181–182; Claes, “Negotiating
constitutional identity or whose identity is it anyway?” in Claes et al. (Eds.), Constitutional
Conversations in Europe (CUP, 2012), pp. 205–233, at 207.
148. Cloots, ibid., p. 183.
149. E.g. Faraguna, “The Italian Constitutional Court in re Taricco: Gauweiler in the
Roman campagna”, 31 Jan. 2017, Verfassungsblog, available at <verfassungsblog.de/the-
italian-constitutional-court-in-re-taricco-gauweiler-in-the-roman-campagna/>; Bassini and
Pollicino, op. cit. supra note 118.
150. Opinion, para 180.
151. Hungarian Constitutional Court, 30 Nov. 2016, Decision 22/2016. See Halmai, “Abuse
of constitutional identity: The Hungarian Constitutional Court on interpretation of Article
E)(2) of the Fundamental Law”, 43 Review of Central and East European Law (2018), 23–42.
CML Rev. 20181542 Case law
This is not to say that the Italian Constitutional Court was wrong to invoke
its controlimiti doctrine, or to warn the ECJ that it would be prepared to
declare the Taricco obligation unconstitutional. This threat certainly
influenced the ECJ’s approach to the benefit of individual right holders.152
Moreover, from a conceptual perspective, the approaches of the ECJ and the
Italian Constitutional Court are in line with theories of constitutional
pluralism; both courts indicate that their own legal orders are ultimately
superior, but, at the same time, they recognize the authority of the other legal
order and make a number of concessions to reflect this recognition.153
5.5. Intransparent reasoning, but a welcome outcome
The ECJ’s reasoning inM.A.S. was rightly criticized for its lack of clarity.154
Considering the constitutional importance of the ruling, the Court should have
made its reasoning more transparent. It can be speculated that the reasoning
remained vague because the Grand Chamber had to reach a compromise on a
controversial issue. The fact that it took almost a year for the judgment to be
delivered points in the same direction. Under the expedited procedure,
judgments are usually delivered, on average, within four months.155 Another
reason might be that the ECJ preferred to leave open in which direction it will
develop the relationship between EU and national fundamental rights in future
cases.156
While the reasoning was not transparent enough, the outcome of the case is
to be welcomed. The ECJ is sometimes criticized for prioritizing the effective
enforcement of EU law over fundamental rights protection.157 In the present
case, however, it took fundamental rights protection seriously by permitting
the national court to apply a higher level of fundamental rights protection than
152. For another example of the effect that national constitutional limits to primacy can
have on the case law of the ECJ, see Case C-404/15, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198.
The ECJ’s judgment in this case is seen as a reaction to the Solange III judgment of the German
Federal Constitutional Court. Hong, “Human dignity, identity review of the European Arrest
Warrant and the Court of Justice as a listener in the dialogue of courts: Solange-III and
Aranyosi”, 12 EuConst (2016), 549–563, 549.
153. On the common denominator of the theories of constitutional pluralism: Jaklic,
Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (OUP, 2014), p. 170.
154. See e.g. Krajewski, op. cit. supra note 85; Pollicino and Bassini, op. cit. supra note 85;
Wegner, op. cit. supra note 114.
155. CJEU, Annual report 2016, QD-AP-17-001-EN-N (2017), 82.
156. On the minimalist methodology of the ECJ: Sarmiento, “Half a case at a time: Dealing
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that of the Charter.158 Individuals in Italy who are accused of VAT fraud
benefit from the most protective interpretation of the principle of legality in
criminal matters.M.A.S.will make its mark in the same way as other landmark
rulings that showed respect to national fundamental rights protection, such as
Omega and Schmidberger.159
The ECJ can also be commended for taking into account the concerns
brought forward by its Italian counterpart.160 The Italian Constitutional Court
has a special and longstanding expertise as a fundamental rights court and as
guardian of the Italian Constitution. At the same time, it showed commitment
to European integration by requesting a preliminary ruling and by extensively
engaging with EU law in its reference. The ECJ was therefore right to place
trust in the assessment of this court and to answer the preliminary questions
accordingly.
The dialogue between the two courts was certainly more successful than in
some other cases. For example, theMelloni judgment was strongly criticized
for being exclusively self-referential.161 Regarding the Ajos case, it was
argued that the main problem was that the ECJ and the Danish Supreme Court
“were unable to find common ground, i.e. to listen genuinely, to explain
properly, and to seek compromises”.162 In M.A.S., on the other hand, both
courts were receptive to the arguments of the other and willing to make
compromises. The preliminary reference and the preliminary ruling are
therefore examples of a successful multilevel cooperation of constitutional
courts.163
158. In 1992, Coppel and O’Neill criticized the ECJ’s selective use of fundamental rights.
Coppel and O’Neill, “The European Court of Justice: Taking rights seriously?”, 29 CML Rev.
(1992), 669–692, 670.
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Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich,
EU:C:2003:333.
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reasoning. See e.g. the statement that it is primarily for the national legislature to lay down rules
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41; Order 24/2017, section 7. See also Judgment, paras. 59–60.
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The decision taken by the ECJ does not pose a substantial threat to the
effective implementation of EU law. Admittedly, a significant number of
individuals that committed VAT fraud affecting the financial interests of the
EU might escape punishment. However, the ECJ allowed for a breach of EU
law to persist only exceptionally, in a specific and narrowly confined
situation. In the event of a future conflict between a national fundamental right
and an obligation of EU law, it will be for the ECJ to determine whether the
conditions for applying a higher national standard of fundamental rights
protection are fulfilled. Besides, M.A.S. was different from Melloni because
the uniform application of EU law is more important in an EAW case.164
Moreover, it is justified that the lack of harmonization of the national
limitation rules by the EU legislature appeared as a significant criterion for the
ECJ’s decision. The Court has developed the doctrine of direct effect as a kind
of sanction against negligent Member States that was meant to benefit
individuals; it rejected reverse vertical direct effect and horizontal effect of
directives.165 However, in the field of criminal law, direct effect can have
considerable negative consequences for individuals, as the present case
illustrated.166 Rules of EU law with direct effect that have such an adverse
impact on the position of individuals should fulfil the requirements of clarity,
precision and foreseeability that are enshrined in EU law and national
constitutional law. A very generally termed provision of EU primary
legislation, such as Article 325 TFEU, is unlikely to fulfil these
requirements.167 Furthermore, to respect the separation of powers at the EU
level, the EU legislature should have had the chance to undertake a
fundamental rights balancing exercise in such cases. It might even be
questioned more generally whether broadly termed provisions of primary law
should have direct effect if they have significant adverse effects on
individuals.
If the requirements for an immediate judicial disapplication of the national
limitation rules are not fulfilled, it is for the national legislature to bring the
national regime of statutory limitation in line with EU law. In contrast to the
national courts, the national legislature can remedy the present breach of EU
law in a way that is compatible with the national principle of legality, by
enacting provisions that are clear, precise and foreseeable. The ECJ and the
164. See section 5.1.2. supra.
165. Rossi, op. cit. supra note 118. See Case C-148/78, Criminal proceedings against
Tullio Ratti, EU:C:1979:110; Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl.,
EU:C:1994:292.
166. Rossi, op. cit. supra note 118.
167. See also Opinion of A.G. Bobek in Case C-574/15, Scialdone, para 166.
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Italian Constitutional Court rightly took into account this division of
responsibilities at the national level.168
While it is to be welcomed that the ECJ allowed the national court to respect
the national principle of legality, it is a pity that it completely avoided
assessing the clarity of the Taricco obligation from the perspective of EU law.
It could have done so by reviewing this obligation in light of the requirements
of foreseeability and precision of Article 49 of the Charter that the national
court was meant to apply to limitation rules. It is highly questionable whether
the criterion that serious VAT fraud escaped criminal punishment “in a
considerable number of cases” is actually precise enough. Even the Advocate
General acknowledged that the criteria identified by the ECJ in Taricco were
too “vague and generic”.169 The Court apparently wanted to avoid criticizing
its own judgment.
6. Conclusion
The ECJ did not change its longstanding principle that EU law enjoys primacy
over domestic constitutional law. Member States cannot give precedence to a
domestic standard of fundamental rights protection because it offers better
protection for individuals or because it is part of their national identity.
However, they are free to apply a national standard of protection within the
scope of application of EU law, if the minimum standard of the Charter and the
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised;
these conditions were fulfilled in the present case.
The ECJ’s reasoning suggests that the national court was allowed to apply
the principle of legality as it is interpreted in Italy because the national
limitation rules in question had not been harmonized by specific provisions of
EU secondary legislation. Instead, they were determined by Article 325
TFEU, a very general provision of primary legislation with direct effect. As
argued above, it makes sense to use the lack of harmonization by the EU
legislature as a significant criterion.
So far, Member States have been able to apply national standards of
fundamental rights protection when EU law left them a degree of
implementing discretion, but this was not the case inM.A.S. Instead, there was
a direct conflict between the obligation of EU law identified by the ECJ in
Taricco and the principle of legality of the Italian Constitution. For this reason,
M.A.S. can be seen as a landmark judgment. It is the first in which a conflict
between an obligation of EU law, compatible with the Charter, and a national
168. Judgment, paras. 41 and 61; Order 24/2017, section 7.
169. Opinion, para 111.
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fundamental right was resolved in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, this
decision does not imply that the ECJ introduced a new exception to the
principle of primacy that can be relied upon by Member States in the future. In
a number of previous cases, the ECJ had accepted that national rules continue
to be applied even though their immediate disapplication would have ended a
situation that was incompatible with EU law. M.A.S. should be read in line
with this case law and interpreted as an exceptional permission to moderate
the full effect of EU law, which was justified by the overriding principle of
legality.
Apparently, the ECJ instructed the national court to give effect to both the
principle of legality of the Charter and the principle of legality of the Italian
Constitution by treating the Charter right as a minimum standard of
protection. The requirements of precision, foreseeability and
non-retroactivity, which were enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter according
to the ECJ, could be extended to limitation rules by the national court.
This comment welcomed the ECJ’s decision, arguing that the Court was
right to take fundamental rights protection seriously and to trust the
assessment of the Italian Constitutional Court. Unlike some other cases,
M.A.S. is an example of a successful multilevel cooperation of constitutional
courts. The outcome does not pose a substantial threat to EU law, in particular
because it will be for the ECJ to determine whether the conditions for applying
a higher national standard of fundamental rights protection are fulfilled in
future cases. What is regrettable, however, is that the reasoning of the ECJ was
opaque, and that the Court did not assess the clarity of the Taricco obligation
from a perspective of EU law.
On 31 May 2018, the Italian Constitutional Court handed down its final
judgment in the M.A.S. case.170 It ruled that the national courts that had
referred the questions of constitutionality did not have to disapply the
limitation rules in question because the Taricco obligation was incompatible
with the principle of legality of the Italian Constitution. The domestic
principle of legality was infringed irrespective of whether the facts took place
before or after the Taricco judgment was delivered. Neither Article 325 TFEU
nor the Taricco judgment itself were sufficiently clear. It is now for the
national legislature to bring the national regime of statutory limitation in line
with EU law.
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